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I. INTRODUCTION 
 What role do lawyers, as lawyers, play in the creation, development, 
and maintenance of the international legal order? This is an oddly 
underexplored question. It has become increasingly popular to look at 
the role various non-state actors—nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs), 1  grassroots activists, 2  scientists, 3  insurgent groups, 4  among 
many others—play in the shaping of international law. It has also 
                                                                                                                      
 * Associate Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. Thank you to 
Tim Meyer, Ingrid Wuerth, and the editors of the Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational 
Law.  
 1. See Suzanne Katzenstein, Reverse-Rhetorical Entrapment: Naming and 
Shaming as a Two-Way Street, 46 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1079, 1083–86 (2013) 
(discussing the shift towards a consequentialist approach to the “naming and shaming” 
of governments by advocacy groups); Peter J. Spiro, Constraining Global Corporate 
Power: A Short Introduction, 46 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1101, 1104–09 (2013) 
(evaluating the increasingly prevalent role of NGOs as monitors of voluntary corporate 
codes of conduct).  
 2. See generally KARIMA BENNOUNE, YOUR FATWA DOES NOT APPLY HERE: 
UNTOLD STORIES FROM THE FIGHT AGAINST MUSLIM FUNDAMENTALISM (2013) 
(providing stories of men and women from more than three hundred countries who, 
through a variety of efforts, challenged muslim fundamentalism and terrorism). 
 3. See, e.g., Timothy L. Meyer, Epistemic Institutions and Epistemic 
Cooperation in International Environmental Governance, 2 TRANSNAT’L ENVTL. L. 1, 19 
(2013) (discussing the relationship between scientific bodies and legal institutions in 
the context of environmental governance). 
 4. See generally Geoffrey S. Corn & Eric Talbot Jensen, Untying the Gordian 
Knot: A Proposal for Determining Applicability of the Laws of War to the War on Terror, 
81 TEMP. L. REV. 787 (2008) (exploring the difficulties inherent in applying the laws of 
war to non-state combatants). 
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become common to talk in terms of the “disaggregated state,”5 and of 
how various substate actors—central bankers,6 regulators,7 judges,8 and 
military personnel9—shape international law and policy through their 
interactions with each other. Nor have international lawyers ever been 
particularly shy about their importance to international law. Oscar 
Schacter famously described “the professional community of 
international lawyers . . . though dispersed throughout the world and 
engaged in diverse occupations” as “a kind of invisible college dedicated 
to a common intellectual enterprise.”10 Martti Koskenniemi has written 
that “[w]ithout international lawyers, there would have been no 
international law.”11 The Statute of the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) even recognizes the “teachings of the most highly qualified 
publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law.”12  And yet, few have focused on the 
                                                                                                                      
 5. See generally ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, NEW WORLD ORDER (2004) 
(describing global governance as an international web of government networks); Peter 
J. Spiro, Disaggregating U.S. Interests in International Law, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 195 (2004) (discussing the subnational and transnational forces and actors that 
weave the United States into the fabric of international regimes). 
 6. See generally CHRIS BRUMMER, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL 
SYSTEM: RULE MAKING IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2012) (considering the various actors 
who play roles in international financial architecture and who create international 
financial rules); David Zaring, Informal Procedure, Hard and Soft, in International 
Administration, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 547 (2005) (describing the role of central bankers in 
international financial regulation). 
 7. See Zaring, supra note 6, at 550 (discussing regulatory revisions made by 
the Basle Committee). See generally Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International 
Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. 
J. INT'L L. 1 (2002). 
 8. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 5, at 85–96 (discussing the role of judicial 
cooperation in transnational litigation); Erik Voeten, Borrowing and Non-Borrowing 
Among International Courts, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 547, 547–48 (2010) (“A growing 
literature asserts that national and international judges increasingly communicate 
with each other and influence each other’s interpretations of legal issues.”).  
 9. See, e.g., PETER ANDREAS & ETHAN NADELMAN, POLICING THE GLOBE: 
CRIMINALIZATION AND CRIME CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 163–65, 191–99 
(2006) (describing military involvement in domestic law enforcement); Amichai Cohen, 
Legal Operational Advice in the Israeli Defense Forces: The International Law 
Department and the Changing Nature of International Humanitarian Law, 26 CONN. J. 
INT'L L. 367, 407–11 (2011) (describing transnational networks of military lawyers). 
 10. Oscar Schacter, The Invisible College of International Lawyers, 72 NW. U. 
L. REV. 217, 217 (1977). 
 11. Martti Koskenniemi, International Lawyers, in THE NEW OXFORD 
COMPANION TO LAW 619, 619 (Peter Cane & Joanne Conaghan eds., 2008). 
 12. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(d), June 26, 1945, 59 
Stat. 1055, 1060 [hereinafter ICJ Statute]. For a discussion of this specific provision, 
see generally Jörg Kammerhofer, Law-Making by Scholars, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK 
ON THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW‐MAKING (Catherine Brölmann 
& Yannick Radi eds., 2013). 
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specific and unique role lawyers might play as state, non-state, and 
substate actors in the international system.13  
 This is an important gap to fill. As Koskenniemi writes, “From 
Hugo Grotius to the International Criminal Court, international law 
has been a project carried out by international lawyers.”14 And any 
account of international law that does not explain the role of lawyers 
will necessarily be deficient. This is particularly the case with regard 
to the mysterious power of precedent in international law. Regardless 
of precedent’s formal role in international law,15 lawyers and judges 
regularly invoke it, respond to it, and cite it as authority.16  Can 
studying lawyers help explain when prior interpretations of 
international law rules will carry weight, when those interpretations 
will frame future arguments, and maybe, when those interpretations 
will burden decisions about compliance?   
II. THE PUZZLE OF INTERNATIONAL PRECEDENT 
 Precedent presents something of a puzzle for international law. 
As a matter of international law doctrine, judicial decisions 
construing international law are not in and of themselves law. 
According to Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ, judicial decisions are 
merely “subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.”17 
They are not generally binding on future parties in future cases, even 
before the same tribunal. 18  In short, precedent, as a matter of 
doctrine, exerts no special force. 
                                                                                                                      
 13. As will be discussed infra notes 85–86 and accompanying text, there is a 
rich vein of literature on the sociology of law and lawyers that starts with Pierre 
Bourdieu and continues through scholars like Bryant Garth and Yves Dezalay. This 
literature has, however, made relatively little penetration into international law 
scholarship. 
 14. Koskenniemi, supra note 11, at 619. 
 15. See infra notes 17–18 and accompanying text. 
 16. See infra notes 19–35 and accompanying text.  
 17. ICJ Statute, supra note 12, at art. 38. 
 18. Id. at art. 59 (“The decision of the Court has no binding force except 
between the parties and in respect of that particular case.”). Technically, Article 38 of 
the ICJ Statute is simply a directive to the court laying out the sources states have 
agreed it should apply in resolving disputes. That said, the sources listed there are 
widely regarded as the sources of international law more broadly. See, e.g., LORI F. 
DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 56–57 (4th ed. 2001); 
MARK W. JANIS & JOHN E. NOYES, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND COMMENTARY 20–
21 (2d ed. 2001) (“An ordinary starting point for international lawyers from most any 
part of the globe when thinking about the formal sources of international law is Article 
38 of the International Court of Justice.”); HENRY J. STEINER, DETLEV F. VAGTS & 
HAROLD HONGJU KOH, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS: MATERIALS AND TEXT 232 
(4th ed. 1994) (quoting the statute and commenting that “[t]his list has significance not 
only for tribunals but also for officials or scholars pursuing the inquiries described 
above”). 
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 And yet, precedent is ubiquitous. Reports from international 
investment arbitration,19 international criminal law,20 international 
human rights,21 and international trade,22 all testify to precedent’s 
apparent authority. Across international law, practitioners invoke it 
and tribunals apply it. This would be remarkable if courts and 
tribunals simply cited their own precedent—international law 
doctrine requires no such result. But courts and tribunals go much 
further (following the lead of international advocates), citing 
positively or negatively even the decisions of unrelated courts and 
tribunals operating in different areas of international law and with 
different mandates. The precedents from one regional body are 
argued to others.23 Precedents from human rights courts are argued 
                                                                                                                      
 19. See, e.g., Int’l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States, Final 
Award, ¶ 129 (Jan. 26, 2006), reprinted in 6 ASPER REV. INT’L BUS. & TRADE L. 419, 571 
(2006) (“In international and international economic law – to which investment 
arbitration properly belongs – there may not be a formal ‘stare decisis’ rule as in 
common law countries, but precedent plays an important role. Tribunals and courts 
may disagree and are at full liberty to deviate from specific awards, but it is hard to 
maintain that they can and should not respect well-established jurisprudence.”); Susan 
D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public 
International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1611–12 
(2005) (“The fact is that investment awards are not technically precedential. . . . As a 
practical matter, however, private investors, governments, and arbitral tribunals rely 
on previous awards to interpret similar provisions in investment treaties.”). 
 20. See, e.g., Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, The Pluralism of International 
Criminal Law, 86 IND. L.J. 1063, 1073–78 (2011) (discussing international criminal 
tribunals’ reliance on precedent, such as the Nuremberg model); William W. Burke-
White, Regionalization of International Criminal Law Enforcement: A Preliminary 
Exploration, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 729, 757–58 (2003) (discussing the role of precedent in 
international criminal law and noting that “a great deal of deference has been 
accorded” to the decisions of the ICTY). 
 21. See, e.g., Christina Binder, The Prohibition of Amnesties by the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, 12 GERMAN L.J. 1203, 1204 (2011) (evaluating the 
Inter-American Court’s dynamic interpretation of rights that, “at times, hardly finds a 
legal basis in the Convention”). 
 22. See, e.g., Zhu Lanye, The Effects of the WTO Dispute Settlement Panel and 
Appellate Body Reports: Is the Dispute Settlement Body Resolving Specific Disputes 
Only or Making Precedent at the Same Time?, 17 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 221, 230 
(2003) (“If we regard precedents as decisions furnishing a basis for determining later 
cases involving similar facts or issues we can say without hesitation that large 
amounts of such precedents exist in the WTO dispute settlement system.”); Raj Bhala, 
The Myth about Stare Decisis and International Trade Law (Part One of a Trilogy), 14 
AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 845, 850 (1999) (“In brief, there is a body of international common 
law of trade emerging as a result of adjudication by the WTO’s Appellate Body.”). 
 23. See, e.g., Laurence R. Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International 
Relations Theory and the Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash Against Human Rights 
Regimes, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1832, 1871–73 (2002) (describing the migration of the 
ECHR precedent to other bodies); see also EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 
REFERENCES TO THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CASE-LAW OF 
THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 3–20 (2012).  
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to investment tribunals.24 Precedents from ad hoc criminal tribunals 
are applied to domestic civil judgments.25 
 To see but one example of the pervasiveness of this pattern, take 
the landmark Prosecutor v. Tadic case before the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).26 Tadic, the 
first case heard by the ICTY, produced a range of important decisions 
on the jurisdiction of the court, the interpretation of its statute, and 
the scope of international criminal liability.27 Those decisions have, of 
course, been widely cited in other decisions of the ICTY.28 Not too 
surprisingly, other international criminal tribunals have cited these 
decisions. 29  The ICJ famously distinguished the test for state 
                                                                                                                      
 24. See generally Andrea K. Bjorklund & Sophie Nappert, Beyond 
Fragmentation, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW - IN MEMORIAM 
THOMAS WÄLDE 439 (2011) (discussing cases). 
 25. U.S. courts have, for example, turned to the jurisprudence of the ICTY and 
ICTR to ascertain the standard for aiding and abetting liability under the Alien Tort 
Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350. Compare Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 
2011), with Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 259 
(2d Cir. 2009).  
 26. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999). 
 27. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A-R77, Judgment on 
Allegations of Contempt Against Prior Counsel, ¶ 131 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Jan. 31, 2000) (considering the court’s authority to issue contempt orders); 
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement, Tadic, ¶¶ 115–45 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999) (establishing the test for state attribution); 
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 4–6, 55–60, 128–30 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) (considering jurisdiction, role of customary 
international law, and scope of liability under the statute).  
 28. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Milutinovic, Sainovic & Ojdanic, Case No. IT-99-37-
AR72.2 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 8, 2004) (citing Prosecutor v. 
Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 4–6, 55–60, 128–30 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 
1995)); Prosecutor v. Nikolic, Case No. IT-94-2-S, Sentencing Judgement, ¶ 148 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 18, 2003) (citing Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case 
No. IT-94-1-A & IT-94-1-A, Judgement in Sentencing Appeals (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Jan. 26, 2000)). The citations are in the hundreds, as a Westlaw 
search of the “International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia - Combined 
(INT-ICTY-ALL)” database attests. 
 29. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Rwamakuba, Case No. ICTR-98-44C-T, Decision on 
Appropriate Remedy, ¶ 46 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Jan. 31, 2007) (noting 
recognition in Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence Motion 
for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 15 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) of “certain inherent powers accruing to a Trial Chamber by 
virtue of its nature as a judicial body”); Prosecutor v. Karemera, Ngirumpatse & 
Nzirorera, Case No. ICTR-98-44-R73, Decision on Renewed Motion to Dismiss for Lack 
of Jurisdiction, ¶ 5 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Aug. 5, 2005) (citing Prosecutor v. 
Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 14–49 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) in 
discussion of the Tribunal’s mandated function and incidental jurisdiction). A Westlaw 
search of the “International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (INT-ICTR)” database 
yields over one hundred citations. 
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attribution, “overall control,”30 adopted by the ICTY in Tadic.31 And 
the decisions have been cited in dozens of U.S. federal court 
decisions. 32  More surprisingly perhaps, International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes arbitration panels have cited 
Tadic. 33  It has even made a recent appearance in the U.S. 
Department of Justice White Paper on the legality of targeted 
killings.34 Even this widespread pattern of citation by entities with no 
obligation to do so vastly understates the Tadic precedent’s impact. A 
search yields ten times as many briefs mentioning the decision to 
U.S. courts as decisions eventually citing it.35 Less formal invocations 
of the decision by NGOs and other actors are impossible (or at least 
implausible) to count. And, as will be discussed later, the true impact 
of a precedent will likely be felt in arguments rather than decisions. 
Even citations in arguments cannot capture all the situations in 
which actors predict that precedents will carry weight with others 
and adjust their actions accordingly. 
 Existing accounts of international courts and their decisions 
have a difficult time explaining these patterns. Traditional accounts 
treat precedent as a deliberate design feature.36 States decide at the 
                                                                                                                      
 30. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 43, 
¶ 405 (Feb. 26) (“[T]he degree and nature of a State’s involvement in an armed conflict 
on another State’s territory which is required for the conflict to be characterized as 
international, can . . . differ from the degree and nature of involvement required to give 
rise to that State’s responsibility for a specific act committed in the course of the 
conflict.”). 
 31. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement, Tadic, ¶¶ 145 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999) (“[T]he control of the FRY 
authorities over these armed forces required by international law for considering the 
armed conflict to be international was overall control.”). 
 32. Westlaw Search, ALLCASES, “Tadic.” 
 33. See Italian Republic v. Republic of Cuba, Ad Hoc State-State Arbitration, 
Dissenting Opinion of Attila Tanzi at 10 (Jan. 1, 2008) (issuing a dissent from the final 
award based, in part, upon Tadic), www.italaw.com/cases/documents/583; Waguih Elie 
George Siag, Clorinda Vecchi v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/15, 
Award, at 99 n.453 (June 1, 2009) (citing to Tadic in reference to the idea that there 
exists “an inherent power of an international tribunal to deal with any issues necessary 
for the conduct of matters falling within its jurisdiction”); Teinver S.A., Transportes de 
Cercanías S.A., and Autobuses Urbanos del Sur S.A. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/09/1, Decision on Jurisdiction, at 66 n.373 (Dec. 21, 2012) (noting that claimants 
urged for the “overall control” test articulated in Tadic to be applied). 
 34. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LAWFULNESS OF LETHAL OPERATION DIRECTED 
AGAINST A U.S. CITIZEN WHO IS A SENIOR OPERATIONAL LEADER OF AL-QA’IDA OR AN 
ASSOCIATED FORCE 4–5, available at www.fas.org/irp/eprint/doj-lethal.pdf (citing Tadic 
for the proposition that armed conflicts require hostilities of a certain intensity and 
duration). 
 35. Westlaw Search, ALLBRIEFS, “Tadic.” 
 36. See, e.g., Bhala, supra note 22, at 863–68 (describing the codification of 
sources in the ICJ Statute and Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the 
United States as a traditional starting point for thinking about the impact of tribunal 
judgments on future disputes); Anthea Roberts, Power and Persuasion in Investment 
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outset how much force precedent should have based on their relative 
interests in either predictability or control.37 These accounts look to 
the constitutive agreements setting up particular courts, tribunals, 
and other interpretive bodies, and ask how much authority they 
explicitly or implicitly delegate to these bodies and their decisions.38 
While accounts based on explicit delegation look to a body’s mandate, 
accounts based on implicit delegation look to functional 
considerations like the open-endedness of the treaty’s language or 
whether the treaty seems to create third-party rights holders.39 Given 
that most international law regimes explicitly deny precedent force,40 
this former approach has a hard time explaining the reality of how 
lawyers argue. The latter do a better job suggesting that some 
regimes might be designed with precedent in mind but rely more on 
ex ante normative conclusions about precedent’s desirability for a 
particular regime than on empirical reality.41 Not surprisingly, their 
results are highly contested. 
 Other rationalist approaches suggest that precedent might 
emerge because it is useful.42 In some contexts, states may disagree 
over a particular rule, each preferring a particular interpretation over 
others. Nonetheless, they may prefer a coordination point over 
continued disagreement.43 To the extent third-party decision making 
can provide a mutually acceptable rule (i.e., one that provides 
sufficient benefits to each party), continuing to hew to that rule may 
                                                                                                                      
Treaty Interpretation: The Dual Role of States, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 179, 188 (2010) 
(describing the orthodox position). 
 37. Roberts, supra note 36, at 189 (discussing the balance set in investment 
treaties). 
 38. Id. at 189–90 (examining investment treaties as an example). 
 39. See id. (discussing this difference in the investment tribunal context); see 
also Meredith Crowley & Robert Howse, US–Stainless Steel (Mexico), 9 WORLD TRADE 
REV. 117 (2010) (describing textual and functional perspectives on stare decisis at the 
WTO). 
 40. See Bhala, supra note 22, at 863–68; Roberts, supra note 36, at 189 (“Like 
the judgments of most international courts, investment awards are not given formal 
precedential status.”). 
 41. For example, functionalist accounts often suggest that because human 
rights treaties are vague and designed to protect third parties, human rights bodies 
must be seen as having implicit mandates to fill gaps. E.g., Karen J. Alter, Agents or 
Trustees? International Courts in Their Political Context, 14 EUR. J. INT'L REL. 33, 38–
39 (2008); see also Crowley & Howse, supra note 39 (making a functional case for stare 
decisis at the WTO). 
 42. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in 
International Tribunals, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1, 6 (2005) (“[I]nternational adjudication can 
play a useful role by enabling states to overcome a limited set of cooperation problems 
in international affairs.”). 
 43. This account essentially posits a “battle of the sexes” game in which 
coordination is a dominant strategy, providing obvious benefit over noncooperation, but 
where there are multiple equilibria, each providing greater benefit to one party over 
others. 
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be desirable.44 This explanation treats precedent as epiphenomenal. 
A precedent’s force derives solely from the desirability of the rule 
reflected in it. Neither its status as the opinion of some body nor its 
internal reasoning has any independent effect. Although such an 
account may explain the stickiness of some international precedents, 
these types of accounts have a hard time explaining precedent in 
noncoordination games like human rights.45 They also struggle to 
explain why arguments from precedent would have any force when 
the underlying decision goes against state interests.46 
 More sophisticated rationalist accounts treat precedent as “soft 
law.”47 As these accounts explain, from an individual state’s point of 
view, its legal obligations are defined by predictions of what others 
will consider lawful and unlawful, and precedents can be suggestive 
of that.48 States creating a regime can thus use a tribunal to create 
rules or adopt interpretations that they would not have been able to 
achieve by agreement.49 States reading a court’s views will have to 
take into account the possibility that that decision will be treated as 
binding law by other states and adjust their calculus and actions 
accordingly.50 This account, though, simply assumes that actors will 
treat court decisions as predictive of the obligations other states will 
hold them to.51 What it does not explain, however, is why. 
 Finally, still other accounts see the use of precedent as strategic. 
Arguing to a body from its own precedent may make it more favorably 
inclined to your position. This is true not only for advocates to courts 
or tribunals but also for courts or tribunals trying to seek the support 
of other courts, something empirical data regarding the European 
                                                                                                                      
 44. See Posner & Yoo, supra note 42, at 18 (“[T]he states have a surplus to 
divide . . . and the present value of the payoffs from continued cooperation exceeds the 
short-term gains from cheating.”). 
 45. See, e.g., Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why States Create 
International Tribunals: A Response to Professors Posner and Yoo, 93 CAL. L. REV. 899 
(2005) (objecting to some of the precedential theories presented in Posner & Yoo, supra 
note 42). 
 46. See id. at 914–15 (discussing how Posner and Yoo’s theories ignore that 
states have increasingly been influenced by international independent courts and 
tribunals). 
 47. See generally Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, International 
Common Law: The Soft Law of International Tribunals, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 515 (2009) 
(using the UN Human Rights Committee as a model to examine why states delegate 
power to make soft law to international tribunals). 
 48. Id. at 517 (“Although the decisions are binding only on states before the 
tribunal, the tribunal’s jurisprudence forms a type of soft law that piggybacks on the 
hard legal obligations, and constrains all states subject to the underlying binding 
obligation.”). 
 49. See id. at 516 (suggesting that tribunal rulings influence state behavior 
despite not having binding legal authority). 
 50. See id. at 530 (“A tribunal opines on some set of substantive legal rules, and 
its rulings affect the expectations and beliefs of states.”). 
 51. Id. 
2013] lawyers and precedent 1033 
Court of Justice (ECJ), the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR), and national court precedent seems to bear out. 52  Such 
accounts bring us closer to understanding precedent’s role as 
advocacy, but they too fail to capture why advocates regularly cite 
precedents from courts other than the ones they are trying to 
convince. Perhaps citing other bodies lends prestige,53 but this only 
begs the question where this prestige would come from. Why would 
particular audiences view certain citations in decisions as carrying 
extra weight?  
III. FROM PRODUCT TO PRACTICE 
 Each of these accounts seems to tell part of the story of 
precedent’s emergence within international law, but even together 
they seem incapable of explaining the utter pervasiveness of 
precedent’s attraction. The main deficiency of these accounts is that, 
with the exception of the last one,54 they focus solely on the role of 
states (as opposed to various non-state actors like lawyers) in 
determining precedent’s force. As such, they focus almost entirely on 
the formal moments when the state’s role is most obvious: those 
moments when the law is made—for example, through treaties—or 
applied, when states choose to comply or not to comply, to enforce or 
not to enforce. That focus, though, misses everything that goes on 
before, between, and after those moments of ratification or 
compliance, the ways in which law is transmitted between those 
points, and, in turn, much of what is distinctive about law.  
 What is missing is how law operates as a practice. Law does not 
simply provide rules to be followed. Perhaps distinctively, law also 
sets the norms for discerning, interpreting, advocating, and debating 
the contents of those rules. It provides a set of spoken and unspoken 
ground rules that structure an ongoing claim and response over the 
applicable law. One party argues for one interpretation of the rules; 
another argues for a different one. The law frames which arguments 
are better or worse, which arguments will be convincing, and which 
will fail. 
                                                                                                                      
 52. See, e.g., Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of 
Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 368–69 (1997) (examining the 
interplay between the ECJ and the ECHR). 
 53. See id. at 325–26 (suggesting that the ECJ and ECHR enhance each other’s 
prestige by citing each other’s decisions). 
 54. In fairness, Helfer & Slaughter, see supra note 52, were trying to 
understand the effectiveness of the ECJ and the ECHR, not the operation of 
international precedent, and their approach applied to the question here might 
actually yield similar answers as will be noted below. See infra note 77 and 
accompanying text. 
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 If we really want to understand how and why the law develops 
as it does, we need accounts of this claim and response process, the 
communities of practitioners who bandy over the rules on a regular 
basis, and the ground rules these practitioners coalesce around. This 
is particularly true of precedent, which, as explained below, seems to 
have its greatest impact in legal argumentation. 
 Elsewhere, I have argued that thinking about international law 
as the product of specific communities of practice can help explain the 
philosophical, theoretical, and doctrinal differences developing 
between different areas of international law,55 such as international 
human rights law,56 international criminal law,57 and international 
investment arbitration, 58  as well as the emergence of areas of 
transnational law almost completely divorced from state control like 
global administrative law.59  
 But imagining international law as a product of these 
communities of practice can also help unlock the mystery of 
precedent. Precedent is hard to understand as an objective fact 
disconnected from any particular group of actors. A prior decision by 
a particular legal body is a fact, but how much weight it should be 
given in future debates over a particular rule is dependent on how it 
is perceived by the actors reading it. Precedent is what Friedrich 
Kratochwil60 and John Ruggie61 have described as an “institutional 
fact.” Like a “hit” or a “strike” in baseball, precedent is only a fact 
within the particular rules of a particular institution or community.62 
Just as a student of baseball and a student of cricket will see two very 
different sets of facts in a group of people with bats and a ball on a 
field, so too will actors biased toward the authority of courts or the 
bindingness of precedent perceive the value of a tribunal decision 
differently than actors biased toward state consent, state prerogative, 
and pragmatism. Different international law regimes—international 
human rights law, international humanitarian law, international 
investment law, international environmental law, or international 
criminal law—may involve different mixes of actors—advocates, 
political leaders, diplomats, military personnel, scientists, 
                                                                                                                      
 55. See generally Harlan Grant Cohen, Finding International Law, Part II: Our 
Fragmenting Legal Community, 44 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1049 (2012). 
 56. Id. at 1070–78. 
 57. Id. at 1078–84. 
 58. Id.  
 59. Id. at 1084–89. 
 60. See FRIEDRICH KRATOCHWIL, RULES, NORMS AND DECISIONS 25–28 (1989) 
(providing a detailed explanation of “institutional facts”). 
 61. John Gerard Ruggie, Epistemology, Ontology, and Regimes, in 
CONSTRUCTING THE WORLD POLITY 90–91 (1998) (discussing KRATOCHWIL, supra note 
60). 
 62. See id. at 91 (quoting John Rawls, Two Concepts of Justice, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 
25 (1955)). 
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economists, international lawyers, and domestic lawyers. Each of 
these different actors will bring their own professional norms and 
biases to the debate, and different mixes of actors will agree on 
different norms and operating assumptions. 63  Understanding the 
relative weight that different decisions by different bodies seem to 
carry in different contexts requires understanding the communities of 
actors who might perceive them that way. 
IV. PRECEDENT AS ARGUMENT 
 If we want to understand the weight of precedents within these 
communities of practice, one key group we need to understand is 
lawyers. Lawyers are members of each of these communities. In some 
areas, lawyers dominate the practice; in others, they might not. Do 
lawyers play a special role in precedent’s force? Does the relative 
presence of lawyers in these areas impact the weight that certain 
decisions or interpretations will be given?  
 It is important here to think more clearly about what precedent 
is and what precedent does. What is precedent? Precedent might best 
be understood as the burden prior decisions about a particular rule 
put on future arguments about the content or meaning of the rule.64 
In its weakest form, precedent simply supplies an argument that one 
must respond to; one cannot make an argument about the rule’s 
meaning without some reference to why the prior decision is right, 
wrong, or distinguishable.65 In its strongest form, precedent creates a 
strong presumption that the prior interpretation of the rule is in fact 
the rule. The question we need to answer is not why actors follow or 
do not follow precedent, but instead why it places these burdens on 
arguments about the rule. 
 For lawyers, part of the answer seems to be internal to 
understandings of law and legal reasoning. There is a common 
intuition, reflected in many theories of law, that one of the core 
principles or qualities of law is that it treat like situations alike. Lon 
Fuller describes consistency as part of the internal morality of law,66 
                                                                                                                      
 63. See, e.g., David Luban, Military Necessity and the Cultures of Military Law, 
26 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 315, 318 (2013) (discussing how cultural differences between 
humanitarian lawyers and military lawyers might lead them to different 
interpretations of “the law of war”). 
 64. See Marc Jacob, Precedents: Lawmaking Through International 
Adjudication, 12 GER. L.J. 1005, 1019 (2011) (suggesting that prior decisions can be 
seen as creating argumentative burdens in similar situations going forward). 
 65. See id. (“[D]eliberately ignoring relevant prior decisions is so arbitrary and 
artificial a suggestion as to verge on farce.”). 
 66. See generally LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964). See also Edwin 
W. Tucker, The Morality of Law, by Lon L. Fuller, 40 IND. L.J. 270, 274 (1965) (book 
review). 
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Ronald Dworkin’s law as integrity denies the legitimacy of 
checkerboard laws that treat like cases differently,67 and Tom Franck 
describes coherence and adherence as key factors in the perceived 
legitimacy of laws.68 From this standpoint, precedent’s pull can be 
seen as a direct articulation of rule-of-law norms. If like cases must 
be treated alike, future decisions must at least make reference to 
prior ones.69 To ignore a prior decision entirely might violate basic 
tenets of legal professional ethics.70 
 The connection to rule-of-law principles gives lawyers strong 
normative reasons to give prior precedents at least some weight. This 
is true even if we remain agnostic as to whether these principles are, 
in Fuller’s terms, part of an internal morality of the law.71 Nor must 
we think that lawyers are particularly ethical and pulled toward 
precedent because they have internalized rule-of-law norms. These 
rule-of-law principles have been deeply embedded into the mythology 
of law, are reinforced in the training of lawyers, and are codified in 
both implicit and explicit codes of professional ethics. Lawyers may 
hew toward precedent simply as a matter of self-interest—a fear of 
professional consequences. Internalized professional ethics and fear 
of professional consequences are not mutually exclusive explanations; 
on the contrary, we should expect them to reinforce one another. 
 Sociological explanations reinforce these normative ones. 
Lawyers, as a professional group, have specific sources of political 
and social capital that they can use to maintain their importance and 
relevance in relation to other societal actors.72 Among these sources 
of social and political capital is lawyers’ purported expertise in 
interpreting and applying certain legal sources. This expertise 
includes, among other things, stylized forms of analogical 
reasoning. 73  Lawyers, seeking to maximize their own power and 
                                                                                                                      
 67. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 176–224 (1986). 
 68. Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 705, 712 (1988). 
 69. See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 52, at 319–20 (“In a social or legal 
culture that venerates tradition for its own sake, consistency with earlier decisions 
provides an autonomous bulwark of legitimacy.”). 
 70. See Jacob, supra note 64 (“[D]eliberately ignoring relevant prior decisions is 
so arbitrary and artificial a suggestion as to verge on farce.”). 
 71. See generally FULLER, supra note 66. 
 72. For a broader discussion of lawyers and their political and social capital, 
see generally YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL 
ORDER (1998). 
 73. See, e.g., Sung Hui Kim, The Last Temptation of Congress: Legislator 
Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Norm Against Corruption, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 845, 
892 (2013) (“[A]nalogical reasoning is what judges and lawyers do every day.”); Vicki 
Jackson, Narratives of Federalism: Of Continuities and Comparative Constitutional 
Experience, 51 DUKE L.J. 223, 270 (2001) (remarking that “lawyers and judges, [are] 
trained in analogical reasoning both in law schools and in practice”). 
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authority vis-à-vis other international actors, will want to emphasize 
the value of precedents and their unique ability to understand them.  
 In other words, lawyers at the U.S. Department of State or 
Department of Defense may argue that precedents need to be 
followed (a) because they believe that rule of law requires it, (b) 
because they fear formal or informal, professional or group sanction 
(i.e., shunning) if they fail to adhere to it, or (c) because arguing for 
precedent reinforces their authority within decision-making circles.74 
We do not need to choose between these reasons; they reinforce one 
another.    
 These normative and sociological explanations suggest that at 
least some decisions will carry a certain amount of weight among 
lawyers. Although they are too abstract to suggest exactly which 
ones, they may hint at some of the factors that might give some 
precedents greater pull than others. A broader account of these 
factors will have to wait for a (much) longer paper, but some initial 
thoughts follow. 
 Precedents may matter to traditional (nonlawyer) state actors 
but in specific ways. For traditional state actors, precedent places a 
burden on action to the extent it predicts how other states will react 
in the future. It reflects a prediction about state actions rather than 
about court or expert reasoning.75 A coherent system of law is not 
nearly as important as a coherent account of state actions or 
preferences. This means, in turn, that the precedents that have 
authority—that carry weight—will be the ones that can best channel 
and articulate state preferences.76 
 An account of precedent as an outgrowth of legal professional 
reasoning suggests different sources of authority. If the weight of 
precedent results from a legal norm of consistent treatment, then 
those interpreters who can wield the strongest legal reasoning—who 
are most able to fit their decisions into a greater, more coherent 
picture of the law—will place more of a burden on future arguments 
than others whose decisions may be less reasoned or that may look 
like legal orphans, distinct from the broader legal corpus. 
 This is suggested by the literature on the effectiveness of judicial 
decision making. Larry Helfer and Anne-Marie Slaughter, for 
example, have suggested that some of the success of the ECHR and 
                                                                                                                      
 74. Cf. Rebecca Ingber, Interpretation Catalysts and Executive Branch Legal 
Decisionmaking, YALE. J. INT’L L. 379–381 (forthcoming 2013) (discussing the 
importance of “who holds the pen” in executive branch legal decision making and how, 
depending on the question posed, certain actors may be given the upper hand).  
 75. See generally Guzman & Meyer, supra note 47 (reviewing the soft law 
effects of international tribunals).  
 76. This arguably tracks current debates over the relative weight that should 
be given to state practice versus reasoned elaboration. See Harlan Grant Cohen, 
International Law’s Erie Moment, 34 MICH. J. INT’L L. 249, 280–91 (2013). 
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the ECJ is attributable to their tactical use and citation of precedent, 
both their own and that of other courts.77 Even more suggestively, in 
a recent study of compliance with ECHR decisions, Erik Voeten found 
that decisions rendered by ECHR panels made up of a majority of 
professional judges were more likely to be complied with than 
decisions made by panels whose majorities hailed from other 
professions, such as diplomats or politicians.78 Voeten suggests that 
this disparity might be explained by the relative importance of 
national judges as an audience for ECHR decisions and as compliance 
agents in enforcing those decisions at home.79 He hypothesizes that 
national judges are more likely to be swayed by decisions that read 
like reasoned court opinions and that professional judges on the 
ECHR are more likely to write decisions that read that way.80 This is 
suggestive of the argument so far that decisions that look more like 
judicial decisions (a) better match legal professional norms and (b) 
better mobilize a legal audience’s political and social capital by 
elevating legal sources and legal reasoning over other 
considerations.81 
 This relationship between audience and authority is important 
because it suggests that judicialization and professionalization 
reinforce one another. The more courts, tribunals, and expert bodies 
in international law, the more legal specialists needed to respond to 
them; the more lawyers in the practice of international law, the more 
force the decisions of courts, tribunals, and expert bodies will have. 
V. LAWYERS AND NORMAL PEOPLE 
 So far, lawyers have been considered as a single monolithic group, 
separate from other potential actors. In reality, lawyers wear many 
different hats, and legal professional norms will only be one demand of 
them. Their memberships in other communities of actors may carry 
other obligations.82 International lawyers, for example, act on behalf of 
                                                                                                                      
 77. Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 52, at 319–20. 
 78. Erik Voeten, Does a Professional Judiciary Induce More Compliance?: 
Evidence from the European Court of Human Rights, *4–6 (Mar. 27, 2012) 
(unpublished working paper), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2029786. 
 79. See id. (explaining that “national judges have an important discretionary 
role” in ECHR implementation). 
 80. See id. at *22 (“To the extent that there is a transnational field of judicial 
professionals with shared ideas and practices about what constitutes legal justification, 
those with practice in this field may be more competent in writing judgments that meet 
the expectations of national judges.”). 
 81. See supra notes 71–76 and accompanying text. 
 82. See generally Luban, supra note 63 (comparing the culture and values of 
military lawyers to humanitarian lawyers); Cohen, supra note 9 (describing the various 
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the state in foreign ministries, defense ministries, and the military.83 
Moreover, different groups of lawyers—domestic criminal prosecutors 
and defense attorneys, commercial litigators, members of the U.S. 
Judge Advocate General’s Corps—will have different operating 
norms. 84  Building on the work of Pierre Bourdieu, 85  a series of 
scholars—including Bryant Garth, Yves Dezalay, and Mikael Rask 
Madsen86—have begun to study the sociology of specific groups of 
lawyers operating in different fields and in different countries, 
examining their training, their culture, and the social and political 
capital they wield in particular political systems. International law 
scholars have barely begun to plumb this work, let alone embark on it 
themselves. Lawyers are only one type of actor within communities of 
practice. The specific norms lawyers as a group bring to the table must 
be studied as one piece in a larger mosaic. 
 Future work might ask, for example, how lawyers interact with 
other actors in specific communities of practice to develop the norms 
of authority in each—human rights, criminal law, trade, or 
investment. The different mix of actors, and the prevalence of lawyers 
as a group within each community,87 should make a difference; it 
should change the mix of factors that will be considered in assessing 
the law.  
 Or, future work might explore what happens when preexisting 
communities overlap, bringing different community norms into 
dialogue or conflict. Some have argued that this is currently taking 
place in international investment arbitration where the professional 
                                                                                                                      
community memberships of the lawyers in the Israeli Defense Forces’ International 
Law Department). 
 83. See Schacter, supra note 10, at 217–18 (describing how the invisible college 
of international lawyers extends into various governmental capacities). 
 84. See generally Luban, supra note 63 (looking at the values of military 
lawyers); Cohen, supra note 9 (describing the various community memberships of the 
lawyers in the Israeli Defense Forces’ International Law Department); DEZALAY & 
GARTH, supra note 72 (exploring the evolution of the values of commercial arbitrators 
from various countries). 
 85. Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical 
Field, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 805 (1987). 
 86. See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 72, at 18–63 (looking at the sociology of 
commercial arbitrators); see also Yves Dezalay & Mikael Rask Madsen, The Force of 
Law and Lawyers: Pierre Bourdieu and the Reflexive Sociology of Law, 8 ANN. REV. L. 
& SOC. SCI. 433 (2012) (discussing Bourdieu’s model and the sociology of law); YVES 
DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, ASIAN LEGAL REVIVALS (2010) (discussing the role of law 
and lawyers in Asia); YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION 
OF PALACE WARS: LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS, AND THE CONTEST TO TRANSFORM LATIN 
AMERICAN STATES (2002); GLOBAL PRESCRIPTIONS: THE PRODUCTION, EXPORTATION, 
AND IMPORTATION OF A NEW LEGAL ORTHODOXY (Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth eds., 
2002) (cataloguing various tools to understand the exportation of U.S.-oriented “rule of 
law”).  
 87. This includes whether the principal legal actors are lawyer statesmen like 
Elihu Root or broad cadres of professional lawyers. 
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biases of commercial arbitration lawyers, international lawyers, and 
domestic constitutional lawyers seem to be pulling in different 
directions.88 A similar phenomenon may explain debates over rules 
regarding the use of force against non-state actors.89 Human rights 
lawyers with a bias toward judicial opinions and teleological 
interpretations are increasingly in conflict with traditional state and 
military actors who continue to look to state practice as the primary 
interpretive guide.90 
 Finally, we might study how lawyers, as citizens of multiple 
communities of practice, may act as conduits for normativity between 
them, bringing precedents from human rights to bear on investment 
arbitration or the law of war. In these pictures, the lawyer is key as 
both a state and non-state actor, maneuvering between the demands 
of citizenship in professional communities, communities of practice, 
and states.91 
                                                                                                                      
 88. See generally Anthea Roberts, Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies 
Shaping the Investment Treaty System, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 45 (2013) (describing the 
conflicting analogies different groups of lawyers apply to investor-state arbitration). 
 89. See Cohen, supra note 76, at 288–91 (discussing scholars differing views on 
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 91. As Schacter writes, “Individuals who move from one role to another are 
unlikely to remain uninfluenced by the ideas and considerations which impinge on 
them in their different capacities. The mingling of the scholarly and the official affects 
both categories, and often creates tension as individuals move from one role to another 
or perceive themselves as acting in the dual capacity of objective scientist and 
government advocate.” Schacter, supra note 10, at 218. 
